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Summary 
This paper studies the relation between Roth's (1976) notion of "supercore" and 
Aumann's (1959) notion of "strong Nash equilibrium" in normal-form games. Inarra 
et al. (2007) studied the relation between the supercore and Nash equilibrium; in 
particular, they offered a procedure to find the supercore in normal-form games. This 
paper extends Inarra et al.'s procedure to complex social interactions. This paper 
shows that the supercore under social interactions coincides with the set of strong 
Nash equilibria in the final game defined in the procedure. This study provides a 
valuable and useful insight into the equilibrium strategic behavior.  
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1 Introduction
The concept of supercore introduced by Roth (1976) is an interesting solution
concept in game theory. It is identied as the intersection of subsolutions in the
context of abstract games. Subsolution is a generalization of solution which
is interpreted by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) as a self-reinforcing
standard of behavior. Subsolution characterizes the set of solutions as internally
stable and self-protecting. Roth (1976) argued that once a subsolution is gener-
ally accepted by the players, it creates expectations reinforcing the notion that
only the outcomes in subsolution are considered sound.
Inarra et al. (2007) studied the relationship between Nash equilibrium and
supercore. Specically, they dened a procedure to identify the supercore. They
showed that the supercore coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of the nal
game dened in the procedure.
However, the concept of Nash equilibrium is based on the idea of stabil-
ity against any unilateral deviation (Nash 1951). Aumann (1959) proposed the
notion of strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) ensuring a more restrictive stability,
which is immune to any coalitional deviation. A SNE is dened as a strategy
prole for which no subset of players has a joint deviation that strictly benets
all of them. Thus, a SNE is a Nash equilibrium and is weakly Pareto efcient
1
among the Nash equilibria.
In order to look into the relationship between strong Nash equilibrium and
supercore, this paper extends Inarra et al.'s procedure to complex social inter-
actions, renes the binary relation dened by Kalai and Schmeidler (1977), and
shows that the supercore under the new binary relation coincides with the set of
strong Nash equilibria in the nal game dened in the procedure.1
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the
preliminaries. Section 3 establishes an abstract system relative to a normal form
game with a newly dened binary relation. Section 4 presents the procedure
characterizing the relationship between SNE and supercore. Section 5 is dedi-
cated to a formal proof of the validity of the procedure. Concluding remarks are
presented in Section 6.
1Greenberg (1990) considered different binary relations that associate normal form games
with abstract systems, including the one discussed in this paper.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the notation and denitions used in this paper.
According to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), (X;) is an abstract
system where X is a set of outcomes and  is the binary preference relation
dened on X . For two outcomes x; y 2 X , we interpret x  y as x dominates
y. Given an outcome x 2 X , its dominion (the set of outcomes dominated by
x) is dened as:
D(x) = fy 2 X : x  yg:
For a non-empty subset A  X ,2 its dominion is dened as:
D(A) =
[
x2A
D(x);
i.e., the set of outcomes dominated by some outcome of A. Let
U(A) = X  D(A)
denote the set of outcomes undominated by any outcome of A.
A subset A  X is the core (Gillies 1959) for (X;) if A = U(X).
We call a subset A  X a vN & M stable set (von Neumann and Morgen-
2All the inclusions used in this paper are weak.
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stern 1953) of (X;), if A = U(A). That is, a vN & M stable set is dened as
a subset A  X that satises:
1. [internal stability] A  U(A), i.e., no element in A dominates another
element in A, and
2. [external stability] U(A)  A, i.e., every element not in A is dominated
by some element in A.
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) interpreted a vN & M stable set as a
standard of behavior in a society, which describes how things are in actual
social organizations.
A subsolution (Roth 1976) of (X;) is a subset A of X such that
1. A  U(A), and
2. A = U2(A), where U2(A) = U(U(A)).
Let P(A) = U(A) A. Given a subsolution A, the setX is partitioned into
three sets: A, D(A) and P(A) (see Figure 1). Note that if A is a vN &M stable
set then A is a subsolution with P(A) = .
Given A  U(A), we can prove that U2(A) = A , P(A)  D(P(A)).
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The reason is as follows (see Inarra et al. 2009):
U(U(A)) = U(A [ P(A))
= X  D(A [ P(A))
= A [ P(A) D(P(A))
= A, P(A)  D(P(A)) and A
\
D(P(A)) = .
Such a property of subsolution can be interpreted by Roth (1976):
Every point in U(A)   A is dominated by some other point in
the same set, and the entire set thus `overrules' itself leaving only
the set A as `sound'.
Figure 1: Partition of X
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Supercore (Roth 1976) is identied as the most signicant subsolution, i.e.
a supercore of (X;) is a subset S of X such that
S =
\
A is a subsolution
A:
Observe that: (1) Every vN & M stable set includes the core, (2) Every vN
& M stable set is a subsolution, and (3) The supercore includes the core.
A (nite) normal form game  N is a triple
< N; fSigi2N ; fuigi2N >;
where N = f1; :::; ng is a nite set of players, Si is the nite set of strategies
for player i and ui : S = i2NSi  ! R is player i's payoff function.
An N -tuple of strategies, s 2 S, is a Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951) for
 N if there do not exist i 2 N and s0i 2 Si such that ui(s0i; s i) > ui(s).
6
Example 1 (supercore for 3-person prisoner's dilemma)
Table 1: 3-person prisoner's dilemma
C D C D
C 1, 1, 1 -1, 3, -1 -1, -1, 3 -2, 2, 2
D 3,-1,-1 2, 2, -2 2, -2, 2 0, 0, 0
C D
Inarra et al. (2007) studied this game in individual situation and solved its
supercore:  = f(D;D;D); (D;C;C); (C;C;D); (C;D;C)g. Observe that it
is formed by the unique Nash equilibrium (D;D;D) and the strategy proles
that any 2 players choose C. Particularly, Inarra et al. proved that the supercore
for the n-person prisoner's dilemma is the unique vN&M stable set of its associ-
ated system. We can verify, in this 3-person prisoner's dilemma, that = U().
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3 The abstract system (S; .)
In this section we dene a new binary relation . on an abstract system relative to
a normal form game by rening the conventional relation which only accounts
for individual protable deviations.3
Denition 1 The abstract system (S; .) associated to the normal-form game
< N; fSigi2N ; fuigi2N > is dened as follows:
1. S = i2NSi;
2. The binary relation . on S is dened as: for s0 ,s 2 S, s0 . s iff 9T  N
s.t. ui(s
0
) > ui(s) 8i 2 T , where s0 = (s0T ; s T ) and s0T 2 ST =i2TSi.
Different from Inarra et al.'s (2007) system, the binary relation dened in the
present paper is based on coalitional deviations. In this case, Nash equilibrium
is no longer considered stable as there may exist opportunities for coalitional
deviations that strictly benet all the members within the coalition. As an ex-
ample, consider the following game:
3See Kalai and Schmeidler (1977); adopted by Inarra et al. (2007).
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Example 2
Table 2: A two-person game
L R
U 2,2 0,0
D 0,0 1,1
The Nash equilibria in this game are (U;L) and (D;R). But notice that
(D;R) can be improved upon by both players jointly agreeing to play (U;L).
This led Aumann (1959) to propose the idea of strong Nash equilibrium:
An N -tuple of strategies, s 2 SN , is a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) for
 N if there do not exist T  N and s0T 2 ST such that ui(s0T ; s T ) > ui(s) for
all i 2 T . The unique strong Nash equilibrium in the above game is (U;L).
Observe that: since no strong Nash equilibrium is dominated by any strategy
prole, the set of strong Nash equilibria coincides with the core, i.e., SNE( N) =
U(S).
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4 The supercore for (S; .) and SNE
In this section, we give an example to illustrate the procedure of deriving the
supercore for (S; .) dened in Section 3. Then we offer the formal procedure
for normal form game.
Example 3 Consider the following game  N0 in Table 3.
Table 3: Game  N0 at stage 0
b1 b2 b3 b4
a1 6,5 6,4 1,3 2,2
a2 3,7 5,6 6,2 1,3
a3 6,4 3,3 5,5 6,0
a4 5,3 2,4 7,2 0,6
At stage 0, we nd out the set of strong Nash equilibria of  N0 . Obviously,
(a1; b1) is the unique Nash equilibrium for this game, and it is also the unique
strong Nash equilibrium. Therefore,
S0 = SNE( 
N
0 ) = f(a1; b1)g:
Then we replace the payoffs to the proles that are dominated by SNE
proles, with the corresponding players' lowest payoffs in the game ( N0 ) at
stage 0  payoffs (0; 0). In particular, we identify the strategic proles domi-
nated by S0 :
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(a1; b2); (a1; b3); (a1; b4); (a2; b1); (a4; b1); (a3; b2); (a4; b2); (a2; b4):
Replace the payoffs from them by (0; 0) and obtain a new game  N1 (see
Table 4).
Table 4: Game  N1 at stage 1
b1 b2 b3 b4
a1 6,5 0,0 0,0 0,0
a2 0,0 5,6 6,2 0,0
a3 6,4 0,0 5,5 6,0
a4 0,0 0,0 7,2 0,6
At stage 1, we carry on a similar procedure conducted in stage 0. First, we
nd the set of SNE proles for  N1 . In order to do so, we rstly identify the set
of Nash equilibria, which is f(a1; b1); (a2; b2)g. As the two NE proles do not
dominate each other in a coalitional situation, they are both SNE proles. Thus,
S1 = f(a1; b1); (a2; b2)g:
Second, replace the payoffs to the proles that are dominated by SNE
with the lowest ones in  N0 . As the proles dominated by S0 are all dominated
at stage 1 and already replaced, we only need to replace the payoffs to the newly
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dominated prole, which is (a2; b3). Then we obtain  N2 and proceed to the next
stage (see Table 5):
Table 5: Game  N2 at stage 2
b1 b2 b3 b4
a1 6,5 0,0 0,0 0,0
a2 0,0 5,6 0,0 0,0
a3 6,4 0,0 5,5 6,0
a4 0,0 0,0 7,2 0,6
At stage 2, we nd that the set of strong Nash equilibria for  N2 is f(a1; b1); (a2; b2)g,
which coincides with that for the previous game  N1 , i.e.
S2 = S

1 :
This is the condition on which the procedure stops. Thus, we claim that
the supercore for the original game is f(a1; b1); (a2; b2)g, that is,
Supercore( N0 ) = f(a1; b1); (a2; b2)g:
To sum up, by repeatedly conducting the nding and replacing process,
the procedure generates a sequence of games f N` g such that the supercore for
the original game coincides with the set of SNE proles in the nal game (note
that the original game is a nite game, so the procedure is nite). Let S` denote
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the set of strong Nash equilibria of  N` . To formalize the procedure, we present
the following denition:
Denition 2 We dene a sequence of games f N` gk`=0 and a sequence of systems
f(S; .`)gk`=0 as follows:
1.  N0 =  N and (S; .0) is the system associated to  N0 .
2. For `  1,  N` =< N; fSigi2N ; fu`igi2N >, with
u`i(s) =
8>><>>:
vi( 
N); if s 2 D` 1(S` 1)
u` 1i (s); otherwise
;
where vi( N) = minfui(s) : s 2 Sg and D` 1(S` 1) is the set of outcomes
dominated by some outcome in S` 1 in (S; .` 1). Dene (S; .`) as the system
associated to  N` .
We are now in a position to present our main results in this paper.
Proposition 1 If Sk = Sk 1, then Sk is the supercore for (S; .0).
Proposition 2 The set of strong Nash equilibria is a subset of supercore for
(S; .0).
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5 Proofs
In order to prove Proposition 1 and 2, we need to introduce the following 2
lemmas.
Lemma 1 4A  B implies U(B)  U(A).
Proof. A  B yields D(A)  D(B); taking complement of D(A) and D(B),
we have U(A)  U(B).
Lemma 2 D`(S` ) = D0(S` ), 8 `  0.
Proof. ( =): At stage `, rst notice that players' payoffs to the strategy proles
in S` have never been replaced since stage 0; the payoffs to a strategy prole
in D0(S` ), on the other hand, either remain the same or have been replaced
with the lowest payoffs. In either case, it is .`-dominated by S` . Therefore,
t 2 D0(S` ) implies t 2 D`(S` ).
(=)): We show this by contradiction. Given a strategy prole t0 2 D`(S` ).
Suppose that t0 is not .0-dominated by any outcome in S` , then according to
the procedure, no replacement will happen to the payoffs to t0 from stage 0 to
stage `, because each set of SNE proles before stage ` (inclusive) are subsets
of S` . Consequently, at stage `, t
0 is still undominated by any prole in S` ,
4This lemma was rst introduced by Roth (1976).
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contradicting the condition t0 2 D`(S` ). Therefore, t0 2 D0(S` ) follows from
t
0 2 D`(S` ).
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
To show that the dened procedure can always generate the supercore, it sufces
to prove that the following two conditions hold:
(i) Sk is a subsolution for (S; .0). That is, Sk  U0(Sk) and Sk = U20 (Sk); 5
(ii) Any other subsolution A for (S; .0) contains Sk .
Proof of condition (i). In the nal game of the sequence,  Nk , every player i's
payoff can be written as
uki (s) =
8>><>>:
vi( 
N); if s 2 D0(Sk)
u0i (s); otherwise
(1)
We rst prove Sk  U0(Sk). As Sk is the set of strong Nash equilibria for
the nal game, all the strategies in Sk do not dominate each other in a coalitional
situation, hence, S  Uk(Sk). Moreover, the payoffs to any strategy prole in
Sk have never been replaced ever since stage 0, thus we have Sk  U0(Sk).
Next we prove Sk = U0(U0(Sk)), which is equivalent to showing thatP0(Sk) 
D0(P0(Sk)). We show it by contradiction. Suppose there is a strategy prole
5U0(Sk) is the set of outcomes undominated by any outcome in Sk in (S; .0):
15
s
0 2 P0(Sk) s.t. s0 =2 D0(P0(Sk)). By Lemma 2, we have Uk(Sk) = U0(Sk),
thus Uk(Sk)=Sk = U0(Sk)=Sk , i.e. Pk(Sk) = P0(Sk). Hence, s0 2 Pk(Sk).
In game  Nk , s
0 is a non-SNE strategy prole and is not dominated by any
strong Nash equilibrium, implying that s0 is .k-dominated by some strategy
prole(s) outside of Sk . The entire set of strategy proles can be divided into
three partitions: Sk , Dk(Sk) and Pk(Sk) (i.e. Uk(Sk)=Sk). Thus the strategy
proles that can possibly .k-dominate s
0 are in either Dk(Sk) or Pk(Sk). It is
impossible to nd one inDk(Sk), because byDk(Sk) = D0(Sk) (Lemma 2) and
equation (1), we conclude that the payoffs to all strategy proles in Dk(Sk) are
replaced with the lowest payoffs, leaving no strategy prole that can possibly
.k-dominate s
0 , hence s0 2 Uk(Dk(Sk)). Therefore, the only possible situa-
tion is s0 2 Dk(Pk(Sk)), i.e. s0 2 Dk(P0(Sk)). It is straightforward that,
uki (s
00
) = u0i (s
00
) 8s00 2 P0(Sk). This means that the payoffs for the strategy
proles in P0(Sk) (including s0) are never replaced. Following this argument,
s
0 2 Dk(P0(Sk)) implies s0 2 D0(P0(Sk)), which contradicts the assumption
s
0
=2 D0(P0(Sk)). Therefore, P0(Sk)  D0(P0(Sk)).
Proof of condition (ii). We proceed by induction. Given any subsolution A of
the abstract system (S; .0), note that S0  A since the set of strong Nash equi-
libria of  N0 is contained in any subsolution of the associated system. Suppose
S` 1  A, we next show that S`  A. Because S` 1  S` , it sufces to show
16
that r 2 A, for any r 2 S` =S` 1.
We claim that r 2 U0(U0(S` 1)). Notice that r 2 S` =S` 1, it is a strong
Nash equilibrium of  N` , but not one for  N` 1. By the construction of  N` , r
can only be .` 1-dominated by some strategy in D` 1(S` 1). That is, r can
never be .` 1-dominated by any strategy in U` 1(S` 1). Notice that in  N` 1, the
payoffs to any strategy prole in U` 1(S` 1) remain the same as in  N0 , thus r
can never be .0-dominated by any strategy in U` 1(S` 1). Hence r cannot be .0-
dominated by U0(S` 1), i.e., r 2 U0(U0(S` 1)), because U0(S` 1) = U` 1(S` 1)
(by Lemma 2).
Finally, S` 1  A implies that U0(U0(S` 1))  U0(U0(A)) (by applying
Lemma1). By the denition of subsolution, U0(U0(A)) = A; thus r 2 A follows
from r 2 U0(U0(S` 1)).
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is straightforward. The procedure of deriving the supercore implies
that SNE( N)  S0  Sk . And in Proposition 1 we have shown that Sk is the
supercore of  N . Therefore, SNE( N0 ) Supercore( N0 ). 
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6 Concluding remarks
This paper extends Inarra et al.'s procedure to complex social interactions. By
integrating coalitional deviations and rening the binary relation on an abstract
system, we explore the relation between strong Nash equilibrium and supercore
in normal form games. We show that the supercore under social interactions
coincides with the set of strong Nash equilibria in the nal game dened in the
procedure. In the original game strong Nash equilibria lie in the supercore.
Inarra et al. (2009) advanced their study by investigating the relationship
between supercore and Nash equilibrium in the mixed extension of normal-form
game. It is interesting to study the relationship between supercore and strong
Nash equilibrium in the mixed extension of normal-form game.
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